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Abstract
The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia) transformed from a traditional guer-
rilla group into a full-fledged insurgency because of its ability to 
effectively convert the proceeds derived from illegal narcotics trafficking 
into operational funds. Those financial capabilities allowed the FARC to 
challenge governmental authority in large swathes of the Colombian state. 
The FARC moved into the drug trade, initially controlling production ter-
ritory and subsequently engaging in trafficking, which allowed the organi-
zation to increase its war-fighting capabilities. This paper only scratches 
the surface of the mechanism by which the FARC utilized its coca revenue 
in order to fund its community reinvestment programs, engage in large-
scale military buildup, and buy political support throughout the region. 
The exploration of the financial side of the FARC adds to our understand-
ing of how insurgencies become successful. Based on open-source infor-
mation, Threat Finance and financial investigative techniques are 
underutilized in foreign policy, law enforcement, and intelligence. The 
critical role played by financing in the rise of the FARC suggests that 
Threat Finance efforts can be most effective when used to track terrorist 
and criminal networks. American law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies should be given bigger budgets and tasked earlier to shut down or 
disrupt financial networks of foreign insurgencies, such as the FARC.
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Introduction
The root of the Colombian Government's war with the FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia) began with the period of Colombian history known as "La 
Violencia." In the 1930s and 1940s, Colombia was led by the leftist Liberal 
Party, which pushed land and democratic reforms and therefore caused a 
backlash from the right-wing, Conservative Party landholders and elites. 
The Liberal Party, facing internal struggles, was defeated in the 1946 elec-
tions. In 1948, leading Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitain was assassinated, and subsequently Colombian society spiraled 
into a civil war that resulted in 200,000 to 300,000 deaths.1 The violence 
escalated in the broader context of the Cold War because the leftists 
received support from Soviet forces, while those on the right were sup-
ported by the United States. The FARC rose out of these armed Marxist 
peasant militias, which were strongly influenced by Communist ideology 
and activists.
Key FARC leaders emerged out of this ideological struggle, including 
Commander Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as Manuel Marulanda 
Velez, or "Tirofijo," and ideological leader and avowed Marxist Jacobo 
Arenas. In 1953, military strongman General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla con-
solidated power and decreed amnesty for Liberal guerrillas. In 1955, after 
consolidating political power, Pinilla reversed his amnesty policy and 
went after the holdout guerrillas and pushed them into the Andean foot-
hills. The leaders retreated to this isolated rural foothold that would even-
tually become the birthplace of the FARC movement.
In 1958, the Liberals and Conservatives reached a political agreement 
known as the National Front, which was a power-sharing agreement 
between the two major political players. Despite the political agreement 
and the declaration of a ceasefire, peasant leaders, such as Arenas and 
Tirofijo, became the targets of an assassination campaign. In 1964, with 
U.S. encouragement and assistance, the Colombian military engaged in 
an operation to destroy the independent "Communist" republics in the 
Colombian countryside. In 1965, the armed peasant leaders held a confer-
ence in the department of Tolima and agreed to adopt a mobile guerrilla 
war strategy. This conference laid the political, ideological, and military 
roots of the FARC, which was officially founded in 1966 in Southern 
Tolima.
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The FARC Confronts Coca
The FARC remained a small-scale jungle-based guerrilla movement 
throughout the 1970s. Alfredo Rangel Suarez, a Colombian military ana-
lyst, argues that small-scale guerrilla movements are primarily predatory 
and rely on financing methods such as episodic extortion, bank robbing, 
and random kidnappings.2 At this point, the movement did not pose a sig-
nificant security threat to state authority. In the late 1970s, the FARC 
began to engage with the local peasants, primarily by supporting the peas-
ants' farming activities. The FARC survived in the 1970s thanks to support 
from poor campesinos (rural peasants) and external ideological partners, 
such as Russian and Cuban communist groups.
A number of factors coalesced in the late 1970s and provided the opportu-
nity for coca to become a major Colombian export, and the FARC capital-
ized on this growth to advance their political and military agenda. Prior to 
this period, most coca leaf was cultivated in Peru and Bolivia for tradi-
tional indigenous uses. In the late 1970s the United States Government 
cracked down on the major marijuana trafficking routes used by Mexican 
and Jamaican drug traffickers. This crackdown created an economic 
opening for Colombian trafficking groups. However, Colombian President 
Ayala also started to crack down on marijuana cultivation. This crack-
down convinced some marijuana traffickers to switch to cocaine traffick-
ing, which was harder for law enforcement officials to detect and also 
more profitable.3
Coca had additional benefits from an agricultural perspective, such as its 
hardiness, its ability to thrive in poor soil, and the ease with which it was 
processed into nonperishable paste. For poor Colombian peasants with 
no land titles and little access to complex irrigation and advanced fertiliz-
ers, coca was the most economically lucrative crop. Additionally, growing 
U.S. demand for cocaine supported high coca prices and a steady demand. 
FARC leaders from the provinces of Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare 
realized the early economic benefits from the coca crop and decided to 
support and tax coca farming as a method of raising funds, despite the 
groups' ideological differences with drugs and drug trafficking.
Seventh Guerrilla Conference and the Adoption of Coca
The Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 occurred at a critical juncture 
in the history of the FARC. The decision by FARC leaders at the Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference to support coca cultivation was a monumental deci-
sion that would have long-lasting implications for Colombian history. Ini-
tially, the FARC was opposed to coca because of its subversive nature and 
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its exploitation by free-market traffickers. However, the revenue that was 
coming from those initial districts convinced the leadership to protect 
coca farmers and charge them a gramaje (farm tax). The FARC's decen-
tralized nature allowed for innovation and risk-taking. The push to adopt 
coca was led by the FARC leaders in the Colombian province of Caquetá. 
The Caquetá front of the FARC was an early adopter of coca farming sup-
port in direct opposition to FARC rules.
The political, economic, and military realities facing the FARC at the time 
of the Seventh Guerrilla Conference dictated the decisions made by the 
FARC leaders. As the FARC leaders convened for the Conference, the 
FARC had eighteen active fronts and had just recently added a general 
staff and a secretariat responsible for centralized planning. Structurally, 
the FARC was beginning to break out of the "defensive" stage of its guer-
rilla warfare. Economically, the FARC would not have been able to capi-
talize on these conditions without a means of financing their expansion. 
The entrance into the drug trade has been widely cited in the literature for 
its role in the FARC's expansion both geographically and in terms of their 
capabilities.4 Coca was a motivator for taking new territory as well as a 
provider of funding to empower the FARC's military units. The Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference marked the time when the group's mentality on coca 
changed, due to the financial needs of its proposed expansion. Structur-
ally, the FARC set up the Financial Commission, which established bud-
gets for each of the FARC fronts. The Commission served as the central 
clearinghouse for the FARC's revenues.
The group's decision to accept and protect coca farmers allowed the FARC 
to expand throughout the Colombian countryside. As the FARC moved 
into new communities, it had to win over the local population. Coca culti-
vation was migrating from Bolivia and Peru into the jungles of Colombia, 
led by narco-trafficking groups. These groups were protected by paramili-
tary organizations which brutally enforced the will of their masters. The 
FARC was expanding into the same regions and thus entered into a tenu-
ous relationship with the narco-trafficking groups.
The FARC vs. the Narco-Trafficking Groups: Key 
Distinctions
In order to understand the Colombian conflict, it is important not to blur 
the key ideological distinction between the FARC and traditional narco-
trafficking groups. Many casual observers lump the FARC into the larger 
group of narco-traffickers because of their involvement in the drug trade. 
However, the FARC was founded as a peasant group whose motivation 
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was to overthrow the state and implement a "people's government." On 
the other hand, narco-trafficking groups were free-market capitalists who 
operated primarily for individual financial enrichment. Politically, narco-
trafficking groups, most prominently the Medellin Cartel, preferred to 
seek out friendly and corruptible government officials. The narco-
trafficking groups aspired to having little governmental oversight, 
enforcement, or pressure. Practically, that translated into paying corrupt 
politicians, enforcement officials, and other civil servants to turn a blind 
eye towards drug-trafficking activities.
The similarity between the FARC and the narco-trafficking groups ended 
with their dependence on coca, coca paste, and cocaine for the majority of 
their revenue. When the FARC first entered the drug trade, they protected 
coca growers and taxed the sale of coca to the narco-traffickers. The 
narco-traffickers would take raw coca leaf or coca paste and process it into 
cocaine. Then they would export the Colombian cocaine to their buyers in 
international locations, such as the United States and Europe. Both 
groups relied heavily on the revenues derived from illegal drug use in the 
developed world.
Unlike the FARC, the narco-trafficking groups wanted to maximize profit 
by reducing associated costs; thus they harassed, intimidated, stole from, 
and generally mistreated peasants in order to get the lowest price for the 
coca leaf. The poor Colombian peasants were not viewed as a long-term 
asset by the narco-traffickers but simply as a short-term partner to be 
abused. Given the narco-trafficking groups' more widespread geographic 
presence, they were more flexible in where they acquired coca leaves and 
paste. The lack of a defined territory reduced the incentive for establish-
ing deep local ties.
The FARC's left-leaning political ideology dictated institutional wealth 
and equality over profit maximization. From the FARC's perspective, the 
peasants were their greatest strategic asset, and profit maximization was 
viewed as an evil of the opposition. When the FARC moved into a new 
community, they first raised coca prices above the level set by narco-
traffickers and provided protection from narco-trafficking thugs. Once 
the FARC had infiltrated a new territory, they adopted state-like functions 
and provided public services to previously ungoverned populations. 
Although the FARC guerrillas moved into a new area with military force, 
they also took responsibility for collecting taxes, settling disputes, 
providing health and educational services, and improving infrastructure, 
such as roads and landing strips. The provision of services and outreach 
to the local community fit with the institutional wealth motto of the 
FARC. The FARC provided pseudo-state functions, including the "Reglas 
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de Convivencia," which regulate such issues as carrying arms, fishing, 
hunting, working hours, liquor consumption, prostitution, interfamily 
violence, drug abuse, and cutting trees.5 One telling example of a FARC 
community project was the beer tax:
"The revenues are used to support local schools and other 
projects. Usually an elected committee from the locality decides 
on disbursement and allocation of the taxes collected. In Remoli-
nos del Caguan, a locality where this beer tax is levied, an elected 
committee of students and teachers was set up to collect the tax 
and disburse it for construction of a local school. FARC members 
enforce the system if the payment is irregular."6
It seems counterintuitive to focus on community level programs such as 
the beer tax allocation in Remolinos del Caguan, but this program is criti-
cal in understanding how the FARC grew from a band of rebels with less 
than 100 members to the largest guerrilla movement in South American 
history. The FARC used the drug trade to become institutionally wealthy; 
this institutional wealth was used to further its political objectives. The 
FARC was able to leverage the support of the local population into territo-
rial control, which led to economic growth, and then military strength.
The Fight over Coca-Farming Land
The two groups started as financial allies, but in the 1980s they competed 
for control of valuable coca farming land. The tension between the traf-
fickers and the FARC increased as the narco-trafficking groups reinvested 
their profits by buying agricultural land in Colombia. These purchases 
displaced campesinos and fueled the FARC's call for agrarian reform. The 
FARC pushed for agrarian reform in order to take land from large land-
holders, especially prominent drug traffickers, and redistribute it to local 
farmers. From the FARC perspective, small peasant farmers supplied coca 
taxes to FARC militants, while large landholders paid paramilitaries to 
harass FARC-friendly populations and attack FARC positions. Agrarian 
reform thus provided political capital and achieved military goals.
As the two groups competed over land, the conflict became violent. 
Despite the FARC's peasant protection strategy, the FARC did mistreat 
some resistant peasant groups. In fact, there is evidence that the FARC 
would forcibly recruit or kidnap young boys into the FARC's military 
ranks.7 The traffickers responded to FARC advances and kidnapping raids 
by creating self-defense groups or paramilitary organizations, most prom-
inently the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia).
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As the FARC witnessed the revenue potential of coca trafficking, it moved 
up the production chain. Initially, FARC operated as a taxer of goods com-
ing into and out of the region, but they were not traffickers. They charged 
the traffickers to import pre-cursor chemicals, such as acetone and sulfu-
ric acid, and taxed the finished product that left the area. Next they taxed 
groups on the maintenance of facilities, aircraft, and for the use of FARC 
landing strips. Over time, they moved into the trafficking business by tak-
ing over coca purchasing, providing pseudo-state functions, eliminating 
trafficking groups, and building refineries.
After the acceptance of coca farming increased their operational strength, 
the FARC expanded into new regions of the Colombian countryside. The 
FARC targeted rural countryside that supported coca cultivation in the 
departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, and Putumayo. By 1990, the FARC 
had opened up nine fronts in the Department of Meta, now a major coca-
producing region. The tenuous relationship between the FARC, the para-
militaries, and the Colombian state erupted into open conflict as the 
FARC expanded its presence and control over the population. As money 
flowed into the coffers of the FARC and the narcos, both groups were able 
to attract, pay, and equip larger numbers of soldiers, albeit oftentimes 
using harsh tactics. Additionally, Colombia experienced a reverse migra-
tion from urban areas into rural areas of coca production—known as the 
coca rush—because of economic weakness in Colombian cities and the 
potential for a get-rich quick lifestyle in narcotics. This reverse migration 
provided a large population of disaffected people who were easily 
recruited by both the FARC and the paramilitary groups.
From a broader economic angle, the coca industry thrived in Colombia in 
the 1990s, due to the exposure of Colombian food products to interna-
tional markets, an increased income inequality in Colombian cities, a 
crackdown on Peruvian and Bolivian coca crops, and a surge in U.S. 
demand for South American cocaine. The Colombian agricultural sector 
accounted for 40% of the national economy in 1945, but by 1984 it 
accounted for only 22.5%.8 As Colombia opened its markets to the global 
economy, many staple crops were no longer profitable, and many farmers 
turned to coca to supplement their income. As Colombian cities grew and 
the urban poor became increasingly disenfranchised, the coca industry 
offered an escape from the dregs of urban life. In fact, many of the major 
coca-producing regions were marked by a population influx.9 
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Methods of Financing during the Growth of the 
FARC
During the 1970s, when the FARC remained a small-scale guerrilla move-
ment, FARC budgets and financing were easily taken care of with hard 
currency. The FARC were confined to a limited territory and had weak ties 
to the people, and thus their economic activities were essentially preda-
tory.10 As military analyst Alfredo Rangel Suarez states:
"At this stage, the insurgent groups are vulnerable to the state's 
coercive apparatus, and consequently they concentrate on 
searching for resources that require minimal exposure and yield 
benefits only once. The crimes most common in this predatory 
mode are episodic extortion, bank robberies, and random 
kidnappings."11 
Reports from military and intelligence officers indicated that the FARC 
was stashing large sums of currency in jungle hideaways.12 With hard cur-
rency from these activities, the FARC did not need to launder funds in 
order to remain operational.
Once coca revenue flooded the FARC's Financial Commission, FARC 
leaders were able to make strategic investments to drastically improve its 
organizational strength. For example, FARC forces were sent to the 
former Soviet Union and Vietnam; a military academy was set up to pre-
pare the guerrillas for a command structure; and investments were made 
in the FARC's command, control, and communications systems.13 Once 
the FARC became entrenched in an area, it was able to generate revenue 
from activities other than coca production, such as extortion, kidnapping, 
the expansion of commerce, and taxing non-coca related goods. Coca 
acted as a gateway to a much wider range of economic activities. The 
FARC used its growing military and state-making powers to break out of 
its traditional areas of control. By "colonizing" new areas of the Colom-
bian state, the FARC became a powerful force in Colombia.
The U.S. and Colombian crackdown on the Medellin and Cali cartels 
created a political and economic vacuum that was partially filled by an 
expanding FARC.14 U.S. and Colombian law enforcement officials 
engaged in the high-profile targeting and capture of major cartels leaders, 
the most famous being Pablo Escobar. Less publicized but arguably more 
important was the 1989 takedown of José Rodriguez-Gacha, Escobar's 
right-hand man and key financier. The Colombian Government, along 
with international partners, froze over $80 million in Gacha's assets. The 
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case was undoubtedly a success for law enforcement and a major blow for 
the Medellin Cartel. In 1993, the news of Escobar's death made 
international news and generated significant praise for American and 
Colombian counternarcotics efforts. However, the elimination of Escobar 
had unforeseen consequences on the Colombian drug trafficking 
environment, such as the fragmentation of trafficking groups. These new 
groups evolved into smaller, decentralized, tightly-knit networks. As the 
trafficking groups proliferated but simultaneously shrank in size, the 
high-profile targeting tactics became ineffective. The new generation of 
narco-traffickers learned to avoid vertical integration and high-profile 
behaviors. As new leaders vied for control of the trafficking trade, the 
FARC seized upon the opportunity to strengthen its control of the 
production phase.
The FARC gradually moved up the production chain by creating alliances 
with international trafficking groups and adopting some characteristics of 
the narco-trafficking groups. Once the FARC had integrated with the local 
community, they set prices, controlled marketplaces, extorted from for-
eign companies, and provided public services. As the revenue from a 
municipality grew, the FARC made infrastructure improvements, such as 
landing strips, processing facilities, better roads, schools, and health clin-
ics. Electoral support for FARC candidates allowed the FARC to gain 
hegemony over large areas of previously ungoverned or weakly governed 
Colombian territory. Once the FARC monopolized state functions in an 
area, they dictated policies and encroached on businesses formerly run by 
external groups, especially narco-traffickers. For example, in 1991, a 
FARC commander boasted about funding his war chest from cocaine lab-
oratories.15 The FARC taxed narco-trafficking groups on the maintenance 
of facilities, aircraft, and for the use of FARC landing strips. With these 
assets, the FARC made connections with international trafficking groups, 
such as the Arellano-Felix cartel based in Tijuana, Mexico.16 
The strategic improvements coincided with a period of weak governance 
by the Colombian state. Even before the surge in drug trafficking in 
Colombia, the government was stricken by tax and tariff avoidance 
through asset and income laundering. According to Economist Francisco 
Thoumi:
"Money laundering itself is a relatively new policy issue, and it 
was not considered a crime in many countries. Following an old 
Spanish legal tradition, Colombia had long-standing legislation 
against 'illicit enrichment,' but it was not 'typified,' and thus it 
was unenforceable. Only in the mid-1990s did Colombia develop 
legislation that typified asset laundering as a crime."17 
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The Colombian Government was simply not aware of or not able to tackle 
this issue, in part because the country was desperate for hard currency; 
and attacking these systems would have depleted international reserves 
during a period of economic fragility.18 
The FARC vs. the Narco-Trafficking Groups: Different 
Money-Laundering Needs
It is critical to make the distinction between the money-laundering 
activities of the FARC and the narco-trafficking groups. For drug 
traffickers, the process of money laundering is much more complex 
because the groups must change money from U.S. dollars into Colombian 
pesos. Colombian cartels, like most influential drug-trafficking 
organizations, generate a large amount of cash at the end of the 
production line—places such as the United States and Europe—and the 
cash must be made available to pay their suppliers. This requires that 
traffickers must launder small, hard currency bills, typically by placing 
them in Western financial institutions, commingling the funds with funds 
generated at cash-intensive businesses, disguising the source of funds, 
and then transferring the balance to overseas accounts. From an Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) perspective, drug traffickers need to hide the 
source of their illicit income and will generally reinvest the money from 
the illicit sector into operational budgets and luxury sectors. This 
occurred in Colombia, most notably in sectors such as real estate, soccer 
teams, import/export business, hotels and casinos, smuggled imports (in 
San Andresitos), and construction. Progress has been made as money-
laundering experts have identified these sectors and provided guidance 
for banks to assist in identifying illegal activity.19
On the other hand, the FARC was motivated by ideology and a desire to 
gain political power. In the beginning, the FARC were simply acting as an 
intermediary between drug traffickers and the peasants; thus they were 
only interested in payment in pesos. As the FARC moved up the coca pro-
duction chain, it needed to adopt some of the money-laundering tech-
niques and investment strategies of the drug traffickers. Still, the FARC 
did not distribute narcotics in the United States; thus they did not need to 
"place" or "hide" the source of their funds. A major distinction remained: 
the FARC was primarily interested in Colombian pesos, while the narco-
trafficking groups were primarily interested in U.S. dollars and other 
internationally liquid currencies.
In the 1980s and 1990s the FARC presented a difficult Threat Finance tar-
get because they did not operate internationally,20 but rather used 
Colombian pesos that had already been laundered. By operating in 
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Colombia, the United States was forced to rely on international coopera-
tion and joint agreements to attack FARC financiers. The lack of political 
will in Colombia, combined with the misguided U.S. drug policies in the 
1980s and early 1990s, allowed the FARC to expand their presence. Once 
the Colombians enlisted American help in the form of Plan Colombia, the 
law enforcement, intelligence, military, and civilian agencies in both 
countries began to coordinate and utilize each other's strengths to break 
the FARC. From a Threat Finance perspective, the first step was to crimi-
nalize money laundering and push for similar reforms that allowed intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies the legal ground to pursue 
investigations.
Just as the FARC moved into the drug production and trafficking busi-
ness, the FARC utilized some of the money-laundering techniques of the 
narco-traffickers. In 1975, the Colombian Government opened the "ven-
tanilla siniestra" (left-hand window) as a means of generating foreign 
exchange. During this period little attention was paid to the concept of 
money or asset laundering, and the Colombian Government followed con-
servative economic policy prescriptions, which stipulated that the accu-
mulation of foreign exchange improves economic health. Unfortunately, 
the ventanilla siniestra sacrificed transparency, rule of law, and tax reve-
nue in its attempt to attract U.S. dollars. The ventanilla siniestra oper-
ated by allowing Colombian financial institutions to accept U.S. dollars 
from any source without questions. Narco-traffickers were effectively sell-
ing U.S. dollars in Colombia for a profit, and then the Central Bank was 
placing the "drug money" into the U.S. financial system. The FARC were 
then paid in cleaned Colombian pesos. The ventanilla siniestra was 
closed in 1991 during a period of economic liberalization in Colombia.21 
The ventanilla siniestra was replaced by the Black Market Peso Exchange 
(BMPE), which by the mid-1990s was the largest known money-
laundering operation in the Western Hemisphere.22 The BMPE operates 
in six steps:
1. Drug cartels accumulate dollars from street sales of narcotics in the 
United States.
2. In Colombia, a cartel representative sells the cash (which stays in the 
United States) to a peso broker at a discount. The broker repays the 
narcotics representative with clean Colombian pesos. The narco-
trafficker is now out of the picture.
3. In the United States, the peso brokers use various methods to "place" 
the cash into U.S. financial institutions.
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4. Back in Colombia, the peso broker locates businessmen who want to 
import U.S. trade goods: electronics, apparel, foodstuffs, cigarettes, 
gold, etc.
5. The broker makes a payment from a U.S. account where the narco-
funds were deposited, to pay for the trade goods.
6. The BMPE represents a tremendous vulnerability because unlike finan-
cial institutions, manufacturers and distributors of trade goods and 
commodities have no systems in place to detect dirty money.23 
During the 1990s, the U.S. Treasury estimated that the BMPE laundered 
$5 billion dollars worth of drug money per year. It is critical to again 
reinforce the distinction between the trafficking groups and the FARC. 
The narco-trafficking groups operated on an international level, while the 
FARC primarily took advantage of the lax Colombian financial system. 
Although even if the FARC is not directly responsible for placing dirty 
money into U.S. financial institutions, the FARC still supplies drug 
distribution networks with their product. These distributors, now mostly 
Mexican-based trafficking groups, are responsible for laundering drug 
funds into the U.S. financial system in order to pay their Colombian 
suppliers.24 
In the past ten years, the BMPE has become more complex because 
placement is occurring in Mexican casas de cambios in addition to 
placement in the United States. Mexican drug-trafficking organizations 
are engaged in the bulk smuggling of cash from the United States into 
Mexico to avoid U.S. regulations and to ease payment to Colombian 
suppliers.25 As outlined above, Step 3 has changed locations, adding 
additional challenges to combating illicit finance flows. Mexican peso 
exchange houses are also involved in international wire transfers that 
fund BMPE purchases. Finally, this added layer has made it easier for 
Colombian suppliers to get access to their funds. There are competing 
hypotheses that explain the addition of Mexican bulk-cash smuggling. 
The first hypothesis states that U.S. legislation, specifically the USA 
PATRIOT Act and its provisions on Bank Secrecy, has deterred criminals 
from abusing the U.S. financial systems.26 The second hypothesis states 
that the rise of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and the ease of 
bulk-cash smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border has made it more 
convenient and secure to place the funds into Mexican financial 
institutions.27 It is clear that the FARC remains a key actor in the money-
laundering network, despite the fact that they are not directly responsible 
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for placing funds into the U.S. financial system. However, the peso 
brokers in Colombia are the ones who enable the FARC to get paid for 
coca and coca-related activities.
The FARC's rapid expansion in the 1990s was fueled by their increasing 
involvement in the narcotics trade and their ability to successfully launder 
the drug proceeds into operational funds. The FARC was able to support 
an increase of 5,000 soldiers from 13,200 in 1989 to its peak of 18,000 in 
the late 1990s. In addition, the FARC military successes forced the newly-
elected Pastrana government to cede 40% of Colombian territory to the 
FARC. President Pastrana withdrew all military and police units from this 
"Zona de Distension" in an effort to establish peace with the FARC. The 
policy was a failure, and the withdrawal of state forces allowed the FARC 
to consolidate its power in the aptly nicknamed "Farclandia."28 In July of 
1999, according to a Gallup poll, approximately 65% of Colombians 
believed the Guerrillas were capable of military victory in Colombia.29 It 
is from the depths of this conflict that the Colombian state was able to res-
cue its country. Much literature has been devoted to unpacking the rea-
sons for the Colombian Government's success, but this paper suggests 
that policymakers should not underestimate the importance of intelli-
gence, law enforcement, and policy reform, particularly in the areas of 
Threat Finance and Anti-Money Laundering.
Recommendations
Policymakers seeking to disrupt and defeat trafficking groups and insur-
gencies should utilize Threat Finance capabilities to identify and elimi-
nate money launderers. Although following the money is currently a 
priority among policymakers, it should be deployed earlier and with more 
resources. From a targeting perspective, the peso brokers in Colombia 
offer a rare link between trafficking groups and Colombian guerrillas. In 
addition to the rare access they have, peso brokers are motivated essen-
tially by greed. They are engaging in illegal activity and earning a hefty 
profit by enabling drug traffickers, drug producers, tax evaders, contra-
band smugglers, and various other criminal organizations. This motiva-
tion makes them an easy target for recruitment. The centralized Financial 
Commission is a key node in the FARC's operational structure. While the 
FARC is generally a decentralized organization with multiple independent 
fronts, the Financial Commission offers intelligence officers a high-value 
target in the fight against the FARC.
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From a law enforcement perspective, more needs to be done to strengthen 
international AML policies. Asset forfeitures, economic sanctions, and 
public shaming all require lengthy judicial or legislative processes, thus 
blunting their power. Besides good intelligence, cash seizures are one of 
the few sharp tools in money-laundering cases. However, they require 
exhaustive investigations, as well as an element of good fortune. Yet cash 
seizures cannot bring down criminal enterprises in isolation. In order to 
fight against narcotics-funded insurgencies, the U.S. needs to fuse law 
enforcement agencies with intelligence capabilities and push for stronger 
AML policies, both in the target country and on the international stage. 
Progress has certainly been made in this area by agencies such as the 
DEA, Treasury, and U.S. military;30 however, this is an area where the 
United States should devote more resources, both domestically and 
through liaison relationships.
Permanent network disruption is a viable goal; however, money and 
financing is extremely fluid and transferrable. It is unlikely that AML 
tools and sanctions can be a long-term or strategic-level tool. In other 
words, tools to "follow the money" are not a panacea for international 
conflict. Rather, Threat Finance should be focused primarily on informa-
tion gathering and used in critical tactical situations. There is always a 
trade-off between excessive regulations, which stifle growth, and lax over-
sight, which misses criminal behavior and creates negative externalities.
Ratification of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement would also be an 
important step in reducing tariffs, increasing transparency, and increas-
ing trade. This would in turn harm the corrupt import/export businesses 
in Colombia by removing the arbitrage opportunities, while promoting 
sustainable economic growth. The BMPE originated because Colombia 
had a history of smuggling goods to avoid high tariffs. In addition to sti-
fling free trade, controlled prices create a demand for black-market goods. 
Promoting growth provides two main benefits to the fight against narco-
terrorist groups, as well as the FARC. First, the implementation of the 
U.S.-Colombia FTA would reduce the black-market demand for dollars by 
removing high tariffs. Without a huge black-market demand for dollars, 
many Colombian money exchange houses would go out of business, and 
the remaining business would be subject to stricter oversight. Secondly, 
economic growth would provide an alternative for poor farmers who cur-
rently grow coca. The rural poverty issue in Colombia can be viewed as a 
fault of the state, or it can be viewed as a consequence of the culture of 
violence and drugs that has attracted migrant workers into the rural coun-
tryside. This land is simply not suited to sustain a large human popula-
tion. As Richani states, "Coca and other illicit plantations generated a 
reverse migration process; the unemployed migrated from cities to areas 
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of colonization."31 Instead of focusing on agricultural assistance pro-
grams, the Colombian state should focus on urban economic growth, 
which could sustainably attract and support an influx of the rural poor.
Conclusion
The FARC could not have assembled its fighting force, bought its 
weapons, bought public officials at all levels, or controlled vast swathes of 
Colombian territory without the ability to launder money. Early FARC 
leaders were confined to a small-scale parasitic existence funded by 
single-event financing activities such as bank robberies, kidnappings, and 
small raids. During the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, the FARC officially 
adopted coca farming as a legitimate means to earn a living. The FARC 
offered protection and better conditions to poor coca peasants in return 
for a small tax on the coca trade. As the coca racket expanded into new 
territories, the FARC's financial revenue exploded. The FARC was able to 
successfully adopt effective money-laundering techniques which 
supported its massive operational, political, and geographic growth. In 
the 1990s the FARC reached its zenith when it was granted 40% of 
Colombian territory in a failed peace deal. An aggressive counternarcotics 
and counterinsurgency strategy, named Plan Colombia, was instituted by 
the Colombian Government with help from the United States. The scope 
of Plan Colombia is beyond this paper, but some of the financial crimes 
prosecuted during this period can attest to its success.
In order to better understand the mechanism of FARC financing, addi-
tional research needs to be undertaken. Information could be gained from 
interviews with FARC leaders and financiers, from money-launderers in 
Colombia, and from law enforcement and intelligence officers who 
worked this topic in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, it would be inter-
esting to discover when the FARC first embraced the black-market 
exchange system. One would expect a strong positive correlation between 
the amount of FARC drug money that moved through the BMPE and the 
military strength of the FARC, measured both in terms of number of 
fighters and percentage of Colombian territory controlled. Colombia has 
made great strides in creating, strengthening, and enforcing its financial 
transparency legislation and institutions. The flip side of that improve-
ment is that during the FARC's ascent, the Colombian financial world was 
rife with corruption, tax-evasion, smuggling, and money-laundering. This 
financial black market enabled the growth of the FARC. 
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The policy implication from this period in Colombian history is that 
without financial oversight, transparency, and enforcement, criminal and 
guerrilla groups were able to thrive. Financial monitoring is another tool 
in the government's arsenal for countering illicit organizations. Threat 
Finance capabilities need to be strengthened and deployed into trouble 
areas before violence erupts, not afterwards. Political reform and 
transparency are generally judged to be secondary priorities in conflict 
areas. However, that view is challenged by the facts in this case because of 
the role black markets played in financing the growth of the FARC's 
insurgent forces. When confronting similar enemies such as the opium-
financed Taliban, U.S. policymakers would be wise to push for financial 
transparency and empower intelligence agencies early on to collect on 
black-market financiers.
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